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o~ ~~ DIx~E.*
Hugo Eckener;
The mystery concerning the loss of the ltDixmude’r(former-
1??the Zeppelin airship “L-72!’)has not yet, four weeks after
its Occurreilce,been cleared up. We know indeed today, ii the
newspaper reports can be trusted, that the airship was burned.,
Charred remains of the ai~ship and crew have been f~~ild,‘W-t
the conclusion dmmn by the press that the airship was struck
by lightning is.pure guesswork. The recovered parts of the
airship and of a corpse indicate, rather, that the airship was
not struck by lightning (i.e., that the hydrogen in the gas
cells was not set on fire by a,flash”of light~ing, but that the
airship was, far more probably, destroyed by the gasoline taking
fire. In the cases investigated during the war, when an air-
ship fell in flames after her *S had been igaited, it was
found that the bodies of the occupants were not at all or only
slightly burned. It often happened.,in fact, that individual
members of the crew escaped with their lives. The newspapers
tell, on the contrary, of burnt frag~ents of flesh which still
*W.-. .-
Cltingto ‘portions”of a uniform;” Such--burnscan only be sustained
in a gasoline fire in the keel corri.d.orand therefore raise the
question as to whether such a fire may,,nothave been the origi-
———._
* Frofii~Luftfahrt,” Jan. 23, 1924, pp. 1-3.
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nal cause of tineburning of the Dixmude. This question will
,.., . .prGbablynever be answe~ed.
The public, however, believes the Dixmude was set on fire
by lightning. 1{ considers this the greatest danger for air-
ships and consequentlya,cceptsit as the most probable’causeJ
when there is no ~od rea,sonfor such an assumption. In fact,
the question as to the magnitude of the danger from lightning
is of extraordinaryimportance in estimating the longevity of
commercial airships and we will therefore first endeavor to
determine what conditions may have led to the destruction of
the Dixmude
Ix may
frame, like
by lightning.
be taken for granted that an airship with a metal
a Zeppelin, is exposed in only a very slight degree
tO the danger of being set on fire by lightning. This has been
demonstrated.by both theory and practice. It must be borne in
mind, however, that an airship is not proof against being struck
by lightning, so much as against being set on fire by lightning.
~ am of the opinion that an airship with a metal frame, when
moving between electrically charged clouds, is not only occasi-
onally, but very frequently, struck by lightening,which is harm-
lessly received by the mass of metal. Theoretically considered,
there are two principal cases -inwhich electrical-flashes orse
sparks may pass from a cloud to an airship. A cloud and the
preaching airship may be oppositely charged and thus cause a
ap-
discharge as soon as they are near enough or, in the other case,
—
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tne airship may simply serve as a good metal conductor for dis-
.,, charges between t~m oppositely charged C1OUC?S. The latter case
mUS,tbe by far the ‘morefrequent, because the electrical ten-
sion of the airship is ordinarily nearly tliesame as that of
the surrounding air, due to the immense radiating surface and
to the exhaust gases.
Theoretically considered-,the exchange of electricity be-
tween the clouds, throu’ghthe metal fr?.meof the airship, would
take -~lacein a harmless manner, because the masses of metal
at bow and stern (the probable entrance and exit of the flash)
are large enough for the transmission to take place without
melting the metal conductor. The correctness of this theory has
been clemonstratedon numerous occasion~ ~~hichhave left notice-
able lightning marks on the bow of the airship. In these in-
stances, no damage was clonethe airship, except, perhaps, the
fusing of certain parts of the radio apparatus. These observa-
tions naturally give no information concerning the surelY much
more numerous
rectly by the
It is an
must be d.rajmn
instances, ?Therethe lightning was received di-
metal girders without leaving any perceptible -mark.
established rule in aviation that the antenna
in on approaching a storm cloud, in order to re-
duce,,thevertical,,e~posur?.and,.c,onsequently,the danger of being
struck by lightning. It is certainly a wise precaution, for dan-
ger should not be incurred unnecessarily. Theoretically,how-
ever, this precaution is unnecessary, from the standpoint that
r.,1,,.,.-l,,.--,-..,-,,.,.—.-M- ——.-— --”..--. ~
Iightning is not dangerous. It seems much more “importantand,
.>
/
in fact, 3,bSOlU”k~ly ilWe~sary, for an airship which finds itself
...
---arcong electii’tallycharged storriiclouds, not to ascend high
enough for the gas valves to o:~en,because hydrogen when escap-
ing from the ventilating shafts,.forms, with the air, an explos-
ive mixture, which passes back along the top of the hull and
might be ignited by a lightning flash striking the airship=
From the foregoing, it follows that the assumption that the
Di.xmude was really set on fire by lightning must raise the ques-
tion as to vhether the gas valves were opened in a thunder-
storm. This must then seem at least very probable. There are
~ three possibilities as to how this might happen. Either the
commander of the airship, out of ignorance, disregarded.the rule
not to open the gas valves, or his airship was carried, against
his wi11 and in spite of the running engines, above the altitude
at vhich the gas valves opened.automatically, or the airshiP
was sailing as a free balloon no longer under control, The first
possibility we will drop as improbable, since, from what we know
of him, the unfortunate cornmander seems to have been a good.pilot.
The second possibility might rather be the case. It can
and should not be assumed (if the use of airships 5,s not to be
condemned outright) that it is impossible to keep an airship,
~~i$,hher.enginesrunning, below’‘the‘al-tifiidetit”‘w+ni& her”gas
.-.,
valves open automatically, provided the cruising altitude is
at
far enough below the altitude/whtih the valves automatically
,–
,.
“5-
.
open. In prudent piloting, it is always possible to fulfill this
~- ,condit~.on“c%foreentezing the storm clouds. In the case of the
,.. ,.,.
Dixmude, however, the pilot probably did not k~ow her location
and did no% Ciar&descend far eiloughbelow the valve-opening
altitude for fear of encounteringmountains.
From the whole course of the voyage, so far as it can be
made out from newspaper reports, it seems to me most probable
that the Dixmude encounteredthe storm practically as a free
balloon and was carried above the valve-opening altitude by ve~-
tical currents. I will not here attempt
probability in detail, as I have a,lready
..
We must wait till the F~ench publish the
to demonstrate this
done in another place~
authentic.reportsfxom
the Dixmude. I will only remark that there is an almost absolute
lack of information concerning what happened between 8 p.me,
December 20, when the airship ~~assighted near Biskra, and 3 a“m’,
December 21, when she fe]-1into the sea off the Sicilian coast.
si.llCe she was driven during this time from ~iskra to Sicily,
after the announced intention of the commander to keep away from
the coast, it
by,the storm,
airship being
appears probable that the Dixmude was carried away
as a fi?eeballoon. There ~?asthe danger of the
driven into the high mountains back of Biskra, when
perhaps one or the other engine stopped and when, perhaps, it was
,.
..,.
endeavored to fly as lov as possible, in order to escape the
stronger winds higher up. In this event th’erewas great danger
of being carried against the cloud-enveloped mountains, perhaps
—-6-’
> by some descending mountain current. At any rate, it is note-
~--- Worthy that, early in the evening of December 20, all r~dio cOm-
l~nication with the airship suddenly ceased; also the circum-
stance that only the body of ,the commander was found and indeed
with serious i-njuries,which cannot be explained simply by the
impact of the car with the water. The falling speed, even of
the completely
99,000 pounds,
then broke the
the (certainly
burned airship, for ‘an assumecl weight of about
COUlClnot have exceeded 50 feet per second. l~nat
armS ~.ndlegs of the commander and l~hatbecame Of
many) other occupants of the pilot car, which so
suddenly ‘oecame dumb?
First of all, I wish to call attention to the fact that, if
the assumption that the airship ~TJasdamaged in the mountains Of
Algiers cannot be accepted, then the presumption arises that sev-
eral.engines ~st have sto~loedand that the airship thus became
the involuntary plaything of the wind.
I.tcannot be too strongly emlshasizedthat the French Navy
.,.
was making an entirely unwarrantable anclcareless use of the
Dixmude. It is true that the airship had-a carrying capacity Of
over 100,000 pounds, but this was for the purpose of making raids
Of one to two days duration and was accOrd-inglydesigned for car–
,.. , rying as much vater
full of gasoline in
days, as the
were made as
her military
1111nlmmml111Inlmmmalll
French
ballast as possible, but not for packing
order to make endurance trips of four to five
Navy employed-her. All parts of the airship
light as possible, in order to be able to perform
tasks. This light construction, which introduced
,(,. m-mm--,,, , , ,,,, ,, , , ., , , .,, ,,,,,. ,. .
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an element of risk f~ow.excessive stresses, was justified only
by the necessity of flying high in ordex to avoid the danger of>
falling a victim to hostile incendiary fire. Under these .circum-
+-=-.
stances, it is almos’tia miracle and a,proof of her good construe.
ti.onthat the I’”ienchhad a,lreadybeen able to carry out a series
of ve~y IODK flights with the Dixmude, especially as they lacked
the il~~&~~~.~Yexperience in the handling of Zeppelins. TJJha~
holds true for the airship, as a whole, applies more particularly
to the engines. The 260 HP Maybach engine was not built for
endurance runs of four to five days, but generally reaches the
.
limit of its efficiency in two.days, when it should be over-
hauled and have certain parts repl?.ted,especially the white-
metal bushings, which can hardly stand a longer period of unin-”
terrupteduse.
Hence it would not be at all strange, but instead, very
Probable that the Dix]~u~ebegan to have engine trouble at about
the time ‘:~henthe wind
stop flight of over 60
use o“fall six engines
engines all the harder,
increased to a storm, i.e., afte~ a non-
hours. Probably she d-idnot have tine
at that time and had to run the remaining
in order ilotto be carried back too far
a.sthe ‘~~indgrew stronger.. This probably soon resulted in put-
ting other engines out of commission, so that the airship no
longer had sufficient speed-and momentum to ~espond-to the
*e, ...
pilotls hand. In other uords, she rapidly became a free balloon.
The further events would have then taken place in accordance
with my previous general remarks.
---
I-8-
-1
& ,.. ., It would be uselefis ‘Lo indulge in fu~ther speculations con-
cerning the events of the last hours on board. We believe, hom-
evcm, that,,during these hours, notes weze dropped overboard by
the cormm.nde~(probably after the failure of the radio), which
nay yet be found. If this expectation should.not be fulfilled,
the assumption would be strengthened that some sudden
occ71rT d which instactly extineqished all life in the
catastrophe
pilot car.
Before me have the expected exp?,.anation,however, we should avoid
pronouncing too hasty judgment on the airship.
.
b,.... ,. ,., ,.
I
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1-...,.. In connection with the preceding article and on account of
the great interest in the fate of the former Gexman airship, we
are Printing the following abstract of an article from the pen
Of the same authox, published January 10, in the ‘)BerlinerZe.itun.g
am Mittag,llwhich seeks to &xplain, on the basis of the then avail-
able information and from the standpoint of a technical eXpert
in aviation, the catastrophe so regrettable for its possible ef-
fect on the furthe~ deveiop,nentof commercial airship transpO~-
ta,tj.o~. Even though later repoxts should show differeilcesin
the d-etails of the last trip of the Difinu.d,e,we believe that
Dr. Eckenerfs expe~t opinions will still be of interest to our
readers.
The Editor.
For the benefit of the newspaper reader who is compelled
to sift doubtful and.often absurd.reports in search of ir.forma-
tion, the following is offered as the most p~obable sequence of
events i~.the loss of the Dixmude.
The Dixmude left Toulon on Tuesday, December 18, vith the
‘expectationof reaching In Salah, about 930 miles southwest of
Tunis, by 4 p.m. of the following day. Here the airship turned
ai~d,a% about 9 a.m. Thursday, December 20, reached a point
somewhat south of Biskxa. She had now been 50 hours in the air..
Then, as the west wind was increasing, her course was changed to
the northwest, toward the city of Algiers, instead of along the
-1 .,.——. — .
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.,
coast toward Ttinis. Her ground-speed dimini~hed as the wind
m., -.,.
continu’ed-to increase. Making an avera~e speed of about 25
miles per hour, she reached Bou Saada at 1430 p.m. Here she
turned toward the south and at 6.30 p.m. was again south of
Biskra= She now remained nearly stationary, apparently with the
intention of “riding out1’the storm. The situatj.onwas ev>-
dently getting serious. Since the engines were probably no
longer in condition to attempt to crom the sea in the face of
the storm, the correct course
gradnally southward, with her
to avoid the stem center and
leeward against the danger of
was doubtless to work the airship
head to the west wind, in order
leave more Ia.ndbehind her to the
being driven back, since the wind
at Bou Saada was blowing directly toward the sea. The commander
proceeded accordingly and, if nothing had gonewrong on the
airship, might ha,vebeen able, by the next day, to turn north
again toward Algiers. According to radio messages, there was
still sufficient fuel for two days, though this es’~imatewas
probably based on not running all the engines at the same time.
The situation was not reassuring, however, since tb.ere
were mountains east of Biskra with peaks rising to 7700 feet,
!,
into which there was danger of being driven, in case the wind
- should increaseorthe engines.fail.to,.,function.In this,event,
it would “benecessary to attain a higher altitude by discharging
ballast, in order to clear the mountains by night and in the
clouds. At higileraltitudes, however, the velocity of the wind
l
,, , , -,,... .. ..
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,, was”doub-tiessgreat m, so that the airship would be carrie~ east
+& ...,.
still more SWiftly* Did the Dixmude have enough free ballast
for such a case? Hardly, since such an ascent would have neces-
sitated the discharge of 40,000 to 44,000 pounds of bal.iast at
the time of tal:ingoff and the fuel thu$ fa~ consumed was per-
haps only 22,000 to 26,000 pound-s..
What actually occurred WaJS probably the following: Some
seven.hou~s late~, around 2 a.m., Fxiilay,Decenber 21, the Dix-
mude fell into the sea off the coast of Sicily. How did she
come to be there? Pro’Oablynot t’nroughthe volition of her
commander ~~ithher engines running, for it is inconceiv~ble
that the commande~ shollldsuddenly abandon his previous correCt
tactics, i-norder to qcIl~rhereverthe storm might carry hiin.
There may have been fuel-enot~ghat noon to ~~~arrantsuch a course,
but not at night, after the supply had been much further re-
duced. 1t cou.ldhardly have happened unintentional y, with the
engines running a$;ainstthe wind, which must have developed
an en.tirely improbable strength, in order to be able to drive
the airship backward 500 miles in seven hours. Hence the only
reasonable assumption is that -theairship was driven by the
as a free balloon with but little, if any, available en-
,,
power. In this event, it ‘isqtii+e”probable that the air-
could have been carried-from the mountains east of Biskra
the 435 miles to the coast of Sicily in six to seven hours.
“Jecan imaqine two causes, which may have converted the
-12-
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“j Dixmude into ‘afree balloon, namely, that she may have come into
. contact with the ground among .-themountains and suffered serious
injuries to her stern, or several of her engines may have
stopped, thus depriving her of
normal powe~. The probability
judged from the radio messages
voyage.
oile-halfto three-fOurths of her
of the latter assumption can be
during the first part of the
After the airship was once in the center of the storm, with
hez steering gear disabled or with little engine power and dy-
namic lift, her flight as a free balloon could only be of short
duration, owing to the precipitation of moisture which would
cause her to sink gradually, entirely apart from the danger of
vertically descending air currents and electrical phenomena.
When the French newspapers blame the Navy for carelessly
exposing the Dixmude to destruction, we are compelled to admit
that their reproaches are largely justified. The airship was
employed, at a very critical and stormy season of the year, to
undertake tasks for which she was not designed. I! is true
that the Dixmude had a carrying capacity””ofover 100,000 pounds
and that, in case of necessity, she could carry sufficient fuel., ~
for a voyage of at least four or “fivedays. For such a long
___
f,ligh.t,name~Y, “fromTou@,to, In,,Salahnearly 1400 miles dis-
,,.
tant in the Sahara Desert, the possibility that a storm might
arise at any time (as demonstrated by the event) should have
been taken into account. Moreover, the airship was not de-
-13-
4 signed for long flights,
‘!
but for military flights of only one
or two days. The object of her large relative and absolutem. .
carrying capacity was to enable her to”ascend to ,avery high al-
titude in order to avoid hostile fire. Her engines were not
designed for a continuous run of four or five days. The manuf-
acturer of the”260 HP Maybach”engines, of which there were six
on the Dixrnud-,e,always refused most decidedly to guarantee them
for more than 48 hours continuous running. Especially, the
crankshaft bearings mere not designed for longer use, Engines
and airship mere both made Iip>t for high altitude military
flights. An entirely new type of engine is being built for the
American airship now under construction in the Zeppelin yards,
in ord-erto insure the endurance of the engines for the trans-
atlantic flight.
Although we are inclined to assume that some injury to the
hull sealed the fate of the Di~ude, we would not deny the pos-
sibility of several engines stopping in short order just before
the critical hour, notwithstanding their previous apparently
good functioning. The Dixmude had already been flying 60
.,
when she encountered the storm, which relentlessly”forced
engines to their utmost capacity at a time when they were
ready suffering from
*,>,.
The future will
so swiftly ‘toSicily
the effects of long continued use.
,,,. ,-
probably explain why the Dixmude was
hours,
her
al-
driven
We are already con-and there wrecked.
vinced, however, that no justifiable conclusions against the
1 -,- —..,... .. . . ..—
F
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use of airships can be ~rawn from this deplorable disasteri
$:
We are not satisfied by the argument that the storm,
.~ in which
the Dixrmzdewas lost, was an especially severe one. %’ewould
~ather acknowledge that ai~ships should not be used for long
commercial flights unless they can safely withstand such a ,
storm as the Dikmude encountered on the Tunisian coast.
Translated by
National Advisory Committee .
fox Aeronautics.
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